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Pricing and Welfare in
Urban Transportation
MASATOSHI A. ABE

Dr. A be is Assistant Professor in the College of Business Administration at Marquette UniveTSity. He holds a B.A. degree in
Mathematics from St. Norbert College, a M .S. degree in Mathematics from Boston College, and a Ph.D. degree in Economics
from the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Since I969 he has
been teach ing microeconomic theory and statistics at iV1.arquette
University. He is a member of the transportation research group
and is currently interested in optimal pricing, particularly in relation to economic efficiency and equity.

HE purpose of this pa per is to review briefly the pricing rule
applied to public facilities and to services such as transportation, then to examine the current pricing practices and some resultant problems in transporta tion , and finally to present some results of our empirical investigation of the mass transit operation
in the Milwaukee area.

T

PRICING RULE

The pncmg rule of public facilities and services should be
aimed at increasing the economic welfare of society by achieving
efficient allocation of resources and equitable distribution of income. Pricing in transportation should, therefore, be used as a
possible means to achieve a balanced and smooth flow of traffic and
to achieve distributional equity.
Therefore in order to give a meaningful discussion of the pricing policy of public facilities and services such as transportation, a
model is needed which in corporates all three strands of economic
disciplines: welfare economics, public finance, and regulatory
institutions.
As it is well known, congestion results from not using a proper
price mechanism: too Iowa price is charged so that an excessive
number of road users is on the roads . This would imply inefficient
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allocation of road users, for congestion results from too many users
during the peak hours and fewer users during the off-peak hours.
If the peak-hour users are persuaded to switch to the off-peak
hours, the problems of congestion may be solved. This is where
the price mechanism comes in. (The fact that people have to use
roads during the peak hours to get to work is ignored here.) A relatively higher price charged during the peak hours and a relatively
lower price during the off-peak hours would accomplish the transfer of some of the peak-period users to the off-peak periods.
The proper use of the price mechanism may, therefore, solve
the problem of congestion, but it will create another formidable
one-the problem of inequity. A higher price charged to the peakperiod users reduces congestion but at the same time prevents the
poor from using the roads. A situation may be conceived where the
peak-period road use is limited only to the rich, and the poor are
forced to give up the use of their automobiles in favor of mass
transit. Therefore, the choice of various combinations of efficiency
and equity must be faced, and a pricing rule is needed to balance
efficiency and distributional equity.
It is well accepted in this respect that price should be set equal
to marginal social cost in order to maximize economic welfare of
society with balanced efficiency and distributional equity. According to the marginal cost pricing rule, the charge for the service
of the road should measure the value of resources used up in providing that service. The rule suggests, therefore, that a toll should
be levied on users during congested hours, and that these tolls must
be such that the private cost of the trip is equal to its marginal
social cost.
DEPARTURE FROM MARGINAL COST PRICING
AND CURRENT PRICING PRACTICES

Marginal cost pricing yields maximum social welfare only
under very restricted circumstances. There must be no market
distortions and the economy must be a perfectly competitive one
where all market sectors follow the marginal cost pricing rule.
Under the current pricing practices in transportation systems,
then, what is required is not a price that is set equal to marginal
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social cost, but a price that deviates systematically from marginal
social cost. This departure of price from marginal social cost is
necessary to increase the economic welfare . of society not just by
achieving efficiency but also by establishing equity.
Three situations are now considered in relation to a two-travel
modes model of private automobiles and bus transit where prices
are required to deviate from marginal social cost.

Peaking of Demand
The demand for transportation service varies substantially
from hour to hour, day to day, or season to season. According to
the marginal cost pricing rule, the price for the peak-hour travel
should be set higher than the price for off-peak travel, reflecting a
widely varying marginal social cost. Keeping price continuously
equal to marginal social cost as it varies when the demand for travel
changes is, however, not possible because of administrative difficulties. The current pricing practice is to keep a single price
throughout the demand cycle. Under this practice the optimal price
that maximizes the welfare for society is not the price which is
equal to marginal social cost, but a price set between the marginal
cost of the peak-hour travel and the marginal cost of the off-pe;:tk
hour travel. 1

Scale Economies and Financing
The idea behind marginal cost pricing was to set user charges
equal to marginal social cost and thus to confront the user with the
true cost of his choice when he makes it. But user charge may not
be large enough to pay back the full investment cost in the facilities
he uses. This can often happen when there exist scale economies.
It should be understood that the rule of self-liquidation as a general guide to efficient operation and investment must be put aside
in the presence of scale economies. In a case where the deficit limit
is imposed, the optimal price should be set higher than marginal
social cost. 2
1. Herbert Mohring, "The Peak Load Problem with Increasing Returns and
Pricing Constraints," American Economic Review, Vol. 60, NO.4 (September 1970),
P·7 00.
2 . Mohring, "The Peak Load Problem," p. 697; William Baumol and David
Bradford, "Optimal Departure from Marginal Cost Pricing," American Economic
Review, Vol. 60, NO.3 (June 1970), p. 270.

422

TRAFFIC QUARTERLY

As shown later in connection with the operation of the Milwaukee bus transit system, it is extremely important to take into
account scale economies and diseconomies in order to understand
the financial problems of transportation operations.

"Highway biased" Financing and Underpriced
Private Automobile Travel
It has been charged that in deciding between private and mass
transportation, the American consumer has been presented for
years and years with a market heavily rigged in favor of use of his
own car. In this connection public policy has been criticized.
It should be noted, however, that public policy is not necessarily
biased in favor of private automobiles and against mass transportation simply because of heavy governmental investment in highways
in metropolitan areas. What truly deserves criticism is the method
of financing highways and the consequent underpricing or subsidization of the peak-hour central-business-district-oriented private
automobile use.
A public mass transit system must recover most of its cost from
charges imposed on those who ride in the peak hours, since other
users are relatively few. In other words, the peak-hour users of
mass transit system are asked to pay the full cost of maintaining the
system. In contrast, a freeway system has its cost spread over a
larger group, since freeways tend to peak less sharply.
Moreover, in most cases the only price the users of highways are
aware of paying for their use of highways is the gasoline tax which
is only a small part of the true cost. The peak-hour CBD-oriented
private automobile users are heavily subsidized from gasoline taxes
and other user charges collected from the off-peak period automobile users and those who use non urban highways.3
Under a situation where automobile use is underpriced, the
optimal price for mass transit system use is not the one equal to
marginal social cost, but rather the price which is less than marginal
social cost, and, under some circumstances, the price which is less
than average social cost. In other words, under the current pricing
practice of underpricing automobile use, mass transit systems
and/or mass transit users should be subsidized.4
3. Dick Netzer, Economics and Urban Problems: Diagnoses and Prescriptions
(New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 143.
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This is not to say "Charge mass transit below its marginal social
cost, because private automobile is priced below its marginal social
cost." It is not an argument of "two wrongs make a right." It is an
argument based on the theoretical formulation of social welfare
maximization: a bus subsidy will improve economic welfare when
automobiles are underpriced.
In summary, the above three cases can be compared with the
ideal case (price equals marginal social cost) as follows:
No price differential between peak and off-peak periods
Price> marginal social cost of the peak period
2. Financial constraint case
Price> marginal social cost
3. Underpricing of automobile case
Bus fare < marginal social cost
or bus fare < average cost (subsidy is justified)
1.

SUBSIDIZATION OF MASS TRANSIT SYSTEM

The above discussion has demonstrated distorted pricing practices of the current transportation system and remedies-the "second best" pricing to maximize social welfare.
One frequently discussed "solution" to urban congestion is to
charge the automobile users considerably more, in view of the fact
that it is automobiles that cause congestion, pollution, and other
intolerable nuisances.
The imposition of higher charges on the use of private automobiles may persuade automobile users to abandon their cars and
ride the public mass transit system. But, as mentioned before,
under such a pricing scheme the lower-income people are victimized. The upper-income people would still use their cars in the
face of higher charges and might even benefit from the opportunity
to be able to use less congested highways. In other wo.rds, charging
the automobile users more may well increase the welfare of the
high-income people but is almost certain to lower the welfare of
the low-income people.
In view of the inequity associated with such a proposal to solve
4. Roger Sherman, "Congestion Interdependence and Urban Transportation
Fares," Econometrica, Vol. 39, NO.3 (May 1971), pp. 565-576. Also his "Subsidies
to Relative Urban Congestion," in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol.
6, NO.1 (January 1972), pp. 21-31.
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urban traffic congestion by setting higher charges on the private
automobile users, proposals have been advanced to subsidize the
mass transit system (or users) and even to provide a free transit. In
recent years there has been growing interest in the reduction of
fares as an incentive to use mass transportation systems, and also to
help provide ghetto residents with accessibility to job centers. Massive investments in rapid transit facilities are being proposed as
a solution to the urban transportation problems, for it is argued
that improved transit service will divert travelers from auto to
public transit, thereby reducing highway congestion, parking problems, and air pollution, as well as decreasing the need for new
highway construction so that land takings and their attendant
disruptions can be reduced.
Kraft, Domencich, and Valette investigated the problem of free
transit.5 Their principal conclusion was that while free transit
contributes to solution of urban transportation problems, improved transit service is gener ally a more efficient means of solving
these problems. Their study showed that transit ridership was more
responsive to improvements in service than to reductions in fares;
and reductions in access times to and from the transit station, as
well as transfer and waiting times, are likely to be particularly
important.
But, as these three invpstigators noted, to identify and evaluate
the effectiveness of any transit subsidy program, a solid understanding of the b'ehavior of urban commuters is needed. A fully
satisfactory statistical demand function which analyzes the behavior
of urban commuters in relation to their reactions to performance
variables of a transportation system has not been developed, mainly
because of the paucity of data.
In the followin g some results of an empirical investigation into
the demand and supply relations of the Milwaukee area bus transit
system are presented, using available data.
A CASE STUDY: THE MILWAUKEE BUS TRANSIT OPERATION

Like virtually all mass transportation systems in this country,
5. Gerald Kraft, Thomas Domencich, and Thomas Valette, "Estimation of
Urban Passenger Travel Behavior: An Economic Demand Model," Highway Re·
search Record No. 2)8 (1968).
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the transit system in the Milwaukee area has been caught in an
unending cycle-continuing decline in patronage, constantly rising
costs of labor and equipment, and an almost periodic increase in
bus fares. There is a reasonable fear that this cycle will lead to the
ultimate extinction of mass transit service in the Milwaukee area
if it is allowed to continue unchecked.
The investigation reported here finds that a lowered bus fare
together with improved service will substantially increase transit
patronage. This in turn will reduce the cost of operating bus
transit as a consequence of the existence of economies of scale. Also
investigation into the socioeconomic characteristics of United
States urban mass transit riders has shown that the majority of the
transit riders are captive riders-riders with no means of transportation other than mass transit. 6
These findings substantiate the contention that mass transit
service should be substantially improved-fares as well as servicesto attract more automobile users to mass transit and to provide
better transportation services to the poor. The empirical foundations of these conclusions are discussed in detail below.

Demand for Transit Service in the Milwaukee Area
The df!mand- side of the transit service was first examined to
find out whether or not a relation exists between the quality of
service and the level of transit patronage.
Time series data obtained from the Milwaukee and Suburban
Transport Corporation for the period of 1955-1970 was used.7
Some results of our regression equations are as follows:
Log Xl

=

R2 =
Log Xl

=

R2 =

9.5210 + 0.8947 log X 2 - 3.0809 log X 4 - 0.2046 log X5
(8.0084)
(- 3.6102)
(- 2.83 85)
0.9954
9.7038 - 2.2141 log X 2 + 3.06°3 log X3 - 0.2367"log X5
(- 2.197 1)
(3. 18 7°)
(- 3. 277°)
0.9948

(1)

(2)

6. Masatoshi Abe and Kumares Sinha, "Pricing and Quality of Service in Urban
Mass Transportation," Journal of American Society of Civil Engineers, forthcoming.
7. Milwaukee and Suburban Transportation Corporation. Annual Report,
each year 1955-1970.
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where
Xl = the number of revenue passengers
X 2 = bus miles of route coverage
Xa = bus hours of service
X 4 = headway factors
X5 = average fare
R2 = coefficient of determination

and numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
The results are statistically significant with high R2'S and tstatistics. It should be noted that the signs of estimated coefficients
are correct-or what would be expected-with exception of X 2 in
equation 2; negative signs of X5 indicate that a rising fare has indeed reduced the patronage volume, while a negative sign of X 4
and a positive sign of X5 imply that a faster and wider service of
trar.sit operation would increase the ridership. We would expect
a positive sign from X 2 , which would suggest that a wider coverage
of transit service would increase the patronage. The sign of X is
negative in equation 2. However, this is due to the fact that X a, bus
hours, another service variable representing transit coverage, was
used in the same equation in addition to X 2 , and that the effect
of X 2 is overshadowed by Xa.
It should be noted that the contribution of X 5 , bus fare , is not
as great as the contribut~ns of the other service variables. Since
regression analysis was applied in the logarithmic forms, each coefficient represents the coefficient of demand elasticity of a respective variable. Therefore, a 1 percent reduction in bus fare, for
example, will increase the ridership only by 0.2 percent, while
1 percent reduction in headway factors will increase the patronage
volume by 3.08 percent.
In sum, the implications of these regression equations are obvious: the transit patronage in the Milwaukee area can be increased
by improving transit services (coverage and speed) and by reducing
bus fares.

Supply of Transit Service: Economies of Scale
The supply side of transit service was then explored to find the
effect of changes in the service variables on the cost of providing
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transit service. The cost per unit service, i.e ., cost per bus mile, may
be critically dependent upon service variables which affect patronage volumes. The crucial point here is th e existence of economies
or diseconomies of scale in transit operation . If deteriorating service and a resultant reduction in transit patronage should yield an
operation with a higher cost per unit, it would indicate that the
transit company was suffering from diseconomies of scale in transit!
operation. To explore the existence of scale economies, Y operating cost per bus mile deflated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
consumer index of transportation, was plotted against Xl ' the
number of revenue passengers. The resulting curve was U-shaped.
To confirm this, the following regression equation was tested:
j ,

Yl

=

13.7003 - 0.1362 Xl + 0.0072 X2 1
(- 8.0427)
(7. 8 9 11)

R 2 = 0.8351

(3)

The result is statistically significant and shows that the curve is
U-shaped. The U-shaped curve indicates that scale economies exist
in the bus transit operation. It should be noted that since around
1960 the transit company in the Milwaukee area has b een operating
in the range of diseconomies of scale. It can be argued , therefore,
that the further reduction in the number of patronage will con- .
sequently raise the unit operating cost of transit.
A simple diagrammatic presentation will clarify this point.
Figure 1 shows the U-shaped average cost curve and three demand
curves. Considering the U-shaped cost curve of the transit system,
increased fares and deteriorating services have shifted the demand
to the left from Dl to D 2 , thus raising the average cost of operating
the transit system. Subsidies to the transit users or to the transit
system, and other measures of improving transit service, would encourage the transit use by shifting the demand back from D2 to D
and to D3 as the analysis of the demand function for bus transit
indicates. Improved transit service may shift upward the average
cost (AC) curve, but the final outcome is most likely to trace such
points as A, B, and C. An increased number of transit users will
reduce the average cost of operating the transit system.
j

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article started out by stating that the pricing rule of public
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Schematic diagram of demand and average cost relationship

facilities and services such as transportation should be aimed at
maximizing economic welfare of society by achieving not only efficiency in resource allocation but also distributional equity. For
this reason the marginal cost pricing rule has been proposed: charge
of the service of the road should reflect the value of the resources
used up in providing that service.
Then the fact that the present pricing practices necessitated
the optimal price level to deviate from marginal social cost was
discussed. That is, the present situation is in the area of the " second best." In the face of the underpriced private automobiles, it
was argued, therefore, that the subsidization of mass transit systems
was justified. It was emphasized that price for mass transit should
not be below its marginal social cost simply because the automobile
users are paying a price below marginal social cost. A subsidy is
required for mass transit in order to increase economic welfare of
society.
The case study of the bus transit service in the Milwaukee area
has shown that improved bus service-lower fares as well as wider
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and faster coverage which would be affected by subsidies-will not
only attract more commuters from automobiles to bus transit, but
in doing so will also reduce the average operating cost of bus
service as a result of utilization of economies of scale that exist in
transit operation.
In view of the fact that the majority of transit users are captive
riders, it was argued, therefore, that in order to rescue the deficit
ridden bus transit operation in the city of Milwaukee, massive
subsidies or even a government take-over of transit operation is a
highly recommended measure. This measure is proposed because
it will increase the economic welfare of the community.
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